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The security of a standard bi-directional “plug & play” quantum key distribution
(QKD) system has been an open question for a long time. This is mainly because
its source is equivalently controlled by an eavesdropper, which means the source is
unknown and untrusted. Qualitative discussion on this subject has been made pre-
viously. In this paper, we present the first quantitative security analysis on a general
class of QKD protocols whose sources are unknown and untrusted. The securities of
standard BB84 protocol, weak+vacuum decoy state protocol, and one-decoy decoy
state protocol, with unknown and untrusted sources are rigorously proved. We derive
rigorous lower bounds to the secure key generation rates of the above three protocols.
Our numerical simulation results show that QKD with an untrusted source gives a
key generation rate that is close to that with a trusted source.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3], when combined with the one-time pad algo-
rithm, provides unconditional communication security. The unconditional security is rigor-
ously proved based on fundamental physics principles such as quantum no-cloning theorem
and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle [4] rather than unproven computational complexity
assumptions. The unconditional security of QKD has been proven even when implemented
on imperfect practical set-ups with coherent laser sources and semi-realistic models [5, 6].
Unconditional security of quantum cryptography is different from “absolute security”.
“Unconditional” in the security proof of QKD means that we are not making any assumption
about Eve’s technology, except that quantum mechanics is correct. However, we do have
to make assumptions on Alice’s and Bob’s sides to ensure the security. The concept of
unconditional security in QKD is discussed in details in [7].
Recently, the ideas of device-independent security proofs of QKD and security from
2causality constraints have been proposed [8, 9, 10], but a complete proof of unconditional
security along those lines is still missing. Moreover, any such device-independent security
proofs, even if successfully constructed in future, will not be applicable practical QKD sys-
tems due to the well-known detection efficiency loophole. This loophole can be filled under
the fair sampling assumption. Unfortunately, the fair sampling assumption can be invalid
in practical QKD set-ups due to some imperfections, like the detection efficiency mismatch.
Indeed, the detection efficiency mismatch opens a back door for several practical attacks,
including the faked states attack [11, 12] and the time-shift attack [13]. The latter attack has
even been experimentally demonstrated on a commercial QKD system [14], thus highlighting
the weakness of practical QKD systems.
It is very important to develop security proofs with testable assumptions, and test the
assumptions both theoretically and experimentally. For example, the assumption of phase
randomization is often made in security proofs of practical set-ups. However, the phases
of signals are not naturally randomized in practice. Fortunately, the validity of the phase-
randomization assumption can be confidently guaranteed by actively randomizing the phase
of each signal, which has only been demonstrated in a recent experiment [15]. See, however,
[16] for a security proof that does not require the phase randomization assumption.
The validity of the coherent state assumption is also questionable. For example, it is
common to use pulsed laser diodes as sources in QKD experiments. These laser diodes are
driven by pulsed electrical currents. When the driving current is switched on, it will take
a short while before the laser’s gain reaches its stabilizing threshold. During this transition
period, the output from the diode cannot be viewed as coherent state. Therefore, it is not
rigorous to consider the entire pulse as a coherent state.
A more severe problem comes from the standard bi-directional (so-called “plug & play”)
design [17], which is widely used in commercial QKD systems. In this particular scheme,
bright pulses are generated by Bob (a receiver) rather than Alice (a sender). The pulses
will travel through the channel, which is fully controlled by Eve (an eavesdropper), before
entering Alice’s lab to get encoded and sent back to Bob. Eve can perform arbitrary opera-
tion on the pulses when they are sent from Bob to Alice. In the worst case, Eve can replace
the original pulses by her own sophisticatedly prepared optical signals. Such an attack is
called the Trojan horse attack [18]. Therefore, it is highly risky to assume that Alice uses a
coherent state source in the security analysis of “plug & play” QKD systems.
3Previously, a qualitative argument on the security of bi-directional QKD system was
provided in [18]. The intuition is to show that by applying heavy attenuation, an input state
with arbitrary photon number distribution can be transformed into an output state with
Poisson-like distribution. However, it is challenging to quantify how close to the Poissonian
state the output state is.
We start from another intuition: we look into the actual photon number distribution
created by the internal loss of Alice’s local lab. The phase randomization can transform
arbitrary input state into a classical mixture of number states [18]. By modeling the internal
loss inside Alice’s local lab as a beam splitter, for each particular input photon number, the
photon number of output state obeys binomial distribution. Note that this is not a binomial-
like, but a rigorous binomial distribution. The analysis of binomial distribution is in general
harder than that of Poisson distribution. However, in this way we can quantitatively and
rigorously analyze its security.
The discovery of decoy methods can dramatically improve the performance (by means
of higher key rate and longer transmission distance) of coherent laser based QKD systems
[19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. The decoy method has been experimentally demonstrated
over long distances [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34].
In decoy state QKD, each bit is randomly assigned as a signal state or one of the decoy
states. Each state has its unique average photon number. These states can be prepared
by setting different internal transmittances λ in Alice’s local lab. For example, if a bit is
assigned as a signal state, the internal transmittance for this bit will be λS. If a bit is
assigned as a decoy state, the internal transmittance for this bit will be λD 6= λS. Normally
λD < λS.
In previous analysis on decoy state QKD [20, 21, 22, 26], one important assumption is
that the yield of n photon state Yn in signal state is the same as Yn in decoy state. i.e.,
Y Sn = Y
D
n . Here Yn is defined as the conditional probability that Bob’s detectors generate
a click given that Alice sends out an n photon signal. This is true because in the analysis
of [20, 21, 22, 26] Eve knows only the output photon number n of each pulse. Another
fundamental assumption is that the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of n photon state en
in signal state is the same as en in decoy state. i.e., e
S
n = e
D
n . Note that, once Eve knows
some additional information about the source, the above two fundamental assumptions will
fail [35].
4We emphasize that in the case of “Plug & Play” QKD, Eve knows both the input photon
number m and the output photon number n. Therefore she can perform an attack that
depends on the values of both m and n. In Section VIA and Appendix A, we show explicitly
that Y Sn 6= Y Dn and eSn 6= eDn in this case. The parameters that are the same for both the
signal state and the decoy states are Ym,n (the conditional probability that Bob’s detectors
click given that this bit enters Alice’s lab with photon number m and emits from Alice’s lab
with photon number n) and em,n (the QBER of bits with m input photons and n output
photons).
In brief, there is more information available to Eve once she controls the source. The
security analysis for decoy state QKD in this case is much more challenging.
In this paper, we analyze the most general case: we consider the source as controlled by
Eve. Therefore the source is completely unknown and untrusted. Rather surprisingly, we
show that even in this most general case, the security of the QKD system can be analyzed
quantitatively and rigorously. We also show that the decoy method can still be used to
enhance the performance of the system dramatically when the source is unknown and un-
trusted. For the first time, we show quantitatively that the security of “plug & play” QKD
system is understandable and achievable. Moreover, we show what measures are necessary
to ensure the security of the QKD system, and rigorously derive a lower bound of the secure
key generation rate. Our numerical simulation results show that QKD with an untrusted
source gives a key generation rate that is close to that with a trusted source.
It is important to implement QKD with testable assumptions. In this paper, we showed
that the coherent source assumption can be removed. Nonetheless, we still keep a few
standard assumptions including single mode assumption, phase randomization assumption,
etc. in our security proof. To ensure that our assumptions of single-mode and phase ran-
domization are satisfied in practice, we propose specific experimental measures for Alice to
implement. More concretely, we propose that Alice uses a strong filter to filter out other op-
tical modes and uses active phase randomization to achieve phase randomization. It would
be interesting to see the security consequence of removing, say, the single mode assumption.
However, this is beyond the scope of this work.
This paper is organized in the following way: in Section II, we propose some measures
that should be included in the QKD set-up, and a key term – “untagged bit” – is defined;
in Section III, we study the experimental properties of the untagged bits; in Section IV,
5the photon number distribution for untagged bits is analyzed; in Section V, we prove the
security of practical QKD system with unknown and untrusted source, and explicitly show
the equation for the key generation rate; in Section VI, we prove the security of two decoy
state protocols – the weak+vacuum protocol and the one-decoy protocol – with unknown
and untrusted sources; in Section VII, numerical simulation results are shown; in Section
VIII, we present our conclusion and discuss future directions.
II. MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY
Here we will use three measures, which were briefly mentioned in [18], to enhance the
security of the system. A general system that has applied these measures is shown in Fig. 1.
There are various sources of losses inside Alice’s apparatus. Here we model all the losses as
a λ/(1− λ) beam splitter. That is, the internal transmittance of Alice’s local lab is λ. We
assume that Alice can set λ accurately via, say variable optical attenuator. In other words,
for any photon that enters the encoding arm, it has a probability λ to get encoded and sent
out from Alice.
1. We pointed out and demonstrated in [14] that the side-channel can be exploited by
Eve to acquire additional information. To shut down these side-channels, we need to
place a filter (Filter in Fig. 1) which works in spectral, spatial, and temporal domains.
In other words, only pulses of the desired mode can pass through the filter. Therefore,
we can use single mode assumption for each signal. Incidentally, the single mode
assumption may not hold for an open-air QKD set-up. This is because 1) the free
space will not suppress the propagation of higher modes and 2) the collection system
at Bob’s side can only collect part of the beam sent from Alice.
2. The phase randomization is a general assumption made in most security proofs on
practical set-ups [5, 6, 20]. It can disentangle the input pulse from Eve by transforming
it into a classical mixture of Fock states
∑
∞
n=0 pn|n〉〈n| [18]. Its feasibility has been
experimentally demonstrated [15]. Alice should apply the phase randomization on the
input optical signals. In Fig. 1, this is accomplished by the Phase Randomizer.
3. We need to monitor the pulse energy to acquire some information about the photon
number distribution. By randomly sampling a portion of the pulses to test the photon
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FIG. 1: A schematic diagram of the set-up that coped with the three measures as suggested: Filter
is used to guarantee the single mode assumption; Phase Randomizer is used to guarantee the phase
randomization assumption; Optical Switch and Intensity Monitor are used to randomly sample the
photon number of input pulses. All the internal losses inside Alice’s local lab is modeled as a
λ/(1 − λ) beam splitter. That is, any input photon has λ probability to get encoded and sent
from Alice to Bob, and 1 − λ probability to be discarded into the Garbage. M and N are the
random variables for input photon numbers and output photon numbers, respectively. Note that
in a standard “plug & play” setup, the actual source is inside Bob’s local lab. However, Eve can
replace the pulses sent by Bob with arbitrary optical signals. This is equivalent to the general case
in which Eve controls the source.
numbers, we can estimate some bounds on the output photon number distribution as
shown in the following sections. In Fig. 1, this is accomplished by the Optical Switch
and the Intensity Monitor.
Suppose that 2K pulses entered Alice’s local lab, within which K pulses were randomly
chosen by the Optical Switch in Fig. 1 for testing photon numbers (these pulses are called
“sampling bits”), and the rest K pulses were encoded and sent to Bob (these pulses are
called “coding bits”). Define the pulses with photon number m ∈ [(1 − δ)N, (1 + δ)N ] as
“untagged” bits, and pulses with photon number m < (1−δ)N or m > (1+δ)N as “tagged”
bits. Note that the definitions of “untagged” and “tagged” here are different from those in
[5]. From random sampling theorem (see, like, [36]) we know that the probability that
there are less than K∆ tagged sampling bits and more than (∆ + ε)K tagged coding bits
is asymptotically less than e−O(ε
2K). ε should be chosen under the condition that ε2K ≫ 1.
Therefore there are no less than (1−∆− ε)K untagged coding bits with high fidelity.
7In the following discussion, we will focus on these (1 − ∆ − ε)K untagged bits. Of
course, there can also be some untagged bits in the rest (∆+ ε)K bits, but neglecting these
out-of-scope untagged bits just makes our analysis conservative.
N and δ can, in principle, be arbitrarily chosen. However, some constraints will be applied
to optimize the key generation rate. We will discuss the optimal choice later.
III. PROPERTIES OF THE UNTAGGED BITS
In QKD experiments, the two most important measurable outputs are the gain [37] and
the QBER. In our analysis, we are more interested in the gain and the QBER of the untagged
bits. This is because the input photon numbers of the untagged bits are concentrated within
a narrow range, making it much easier to analyze the security.
However, Alice cannot in practice perform quantum non-demolishing (QND) measure-
ment on the photon number of the input pulses with current technology. Therefore, she does
not know which bits are tagged and which are untagged. As a result, the gain [37] Q and
the QBER E of the untagged bits cannot be measured experimentally. Here Q is defined as
the conditional probability that Bob’s detector clicks given that Alice sends out an untagged
bit and Alice and Bob use the same basis; E is defined as the conditional probability that
Bob’s bit value is different from Alice’s given that Bob’s detector clicks, Alice sends out an
untagged bit, and Alice and Bob use the same basis.
In an experiment, Alice and Bob can measure the overall gain Qe and the overall QBER
Ee. The subscript e denotes the experimentally measurable overall properties. Moreover,
they know the probability that certain bit to be tagged or untagged from the above analysis.
Although they cannot measure the gain Q and the QBER E of the untagged bits directly,
they can estimate the upper bounds and lower bounds of them. The upper bound and lower
bound of Q are
Q =
Qe
1−∆− ε,
Q = max(0,
Qe −∆− ε
1−∆− ε ).
(1)
The upper bound and lower bound of E ·Q can be estimated as
E ·Q = QeEe
1−∆− ε,
E ·Q = max(0, QeEe −∆− ε
1−∆− ε ).
(2)
8To get tighter bounds on Q and E ·Q, we need to minimize ∆, which means that δ should
be made large so as to minimize the amount of tagged bits. See, however, discussion after
Eqs. (4).
IV. PHOTON NUMBER DISTRIBUTION OF UNTAGGED BITS
Consider an untagged bit with input photon number m ∈ [(1 − δ)N, (1 + δ)N ]. The
conditional probability that n photons are emitted by Alice given that m photons enter
Alice obeys binomial distribution as
Pn(m) =
(
m
n
)
λn(1− λ)m−n. (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) (3)
For untagged bits (i.e., m ∈ [(1 − δ)N, (1 + δ)N ]), we can show that the upper bound
and lower bound of Pn(m) are:
Pn =


(1− λ)(1−δ)N , if n = 0;(
(1+δ)N
n
)
λn(1− λ)(1+δ)N−n, if 1 ≤ n ≤ (1 + δ)N ;
0, if n > (1 + δ)N ;
Pn =


(1− λ)(1+δ)N , if n = 0;(
(1−δ)N
n
)
λn(1− λ)(1−δ)N−n, if 1 ≤ n ≤ (1− δ)N ;
0, if n > (1− δ)N ;
(4)
under Condition 1:
(1 + δ)Nλ < 1. (5)
Condition 1 suggests that the expected output photon number of any untagged bit should
be lower than 1. This is easy to implement experimentally. For example, for N = 106, Alice
can simply set λ = 10−7 so that the expected output photon number is 0.1. Most reported
BB84 implementations satisfy Condition 1.
To get tighter bounds on Pn(m), we need to minimize δ. However, as we discussed below
Eq. (2), minimizing δ will lower the amount of untagged bits (i.e., there will be fewer pulses
contain photon number m ∈ [(1 − δ)N, (1 + δ)N ] as the bound becomes narrower), thus
loosening the bounds on the gains and QBERs of untagged bits. As a summary, there is a
trade-off between the tightness of the bounds of Pn(m) and the tightness of the bounds of
Q and E ·Q. The optimal choice of δ depends on the properties of specific system, and can
be obtained numerically.
9V. GENERALIZED GLLP RESULTS WITH UNTRUSTED SOURCE
From the work of Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) [5], the secure key genera-
tion rate of standard BB84 protocol [1] is given by
R ≥ 1
2
{−Qef(Ee)H2(Ee) +QΩ[1−H2(QeEe
QΩ
)]}, (6)
where 1/2 is the probability that Alice and Bob use the same basis, Qe and Ee are obtained
experimentally, f(> 1) is the bi-directional error correction inefficiency [38], and
Ω = 1− PM
Q
, (7)
where PM =
∑
∞
n=2 Pn(m) is the probability of output multiphoton signals. Recall that if
the input photon number m = (1 + δ)N , we have
Pn((1 + δ)N) =


Pn, if n = 0;
Pn, if n ≥ 1.
Therefore P0+
∑
∞
n=1 Pn = 1. The upper bound of PM is PM =
∑
∞
n=2 Pn = 1−P0−P1, and
the lower bound of Ω is
Ω = 1− PM
Q
.
The lower bound of QΩ is thus given by
QΩ = Q− PM = Q + P0 + P1 − 1, (8)
where Q can be obtained via Eq. (1).
Plugging Eq. (8) into Eq. (6), we have the key generation rate per bit sent by Alice,
given an untrusted source is used, as
R ≥ 1
2
{−Qef(Ee)H2(Ee) + (Q+ P0 + P1 − 1)[1−H2( QeEe
Q + P0 + P1 − 1
)]}. (9)
The numerical simulation of the above analysis is presented in Section VII.
VI. COMBINING WITH DECOY STATES
Decoy method [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] significantly improves the performance for QKD
systems with coherent state source. Here, we will show that the idea of decoy states can
also be useful when the source is unknown and untrusted.
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A. Weak+vacuum protocol
Among all the decoy state protocols, the weak+vacuum protocol is the most popular one.
It is shown to be the optimal protocol in asymptotic case [22]. “Asymptotic” here means
infinitely long source data sequence. The weak+vacuum protocol has been used in most
experimental decoy state QKD implementations [28, 29, 30, 31, 32].
In weak+vacuum protocol, there are three states: the signal state (for which the internal
transmittance of Alice is λS), the weak decoy state (for which the internal transmittance of
Alice is λD < λS), and the vacuum state (for which the internal transmittance of Alice is
0). We consider that only the signal state is used to generate the final key, while the decoy
states are solely used to test the channel properties.
The error correction will consume
rEC = Q
S
e f(E
S
e )H2(E
S
e ) (10)
bit per signal sent from Alice, where QSe and E
S
e are the overall gain and overall QBER of
signal state, H2 is binary Shannon function.
The probability that Alice sends out an untagged signal which is securely transmitted to
Bob is
rPA = (1−∆− ε)QS1 [1−H2(eS1 )], (11)
where QS1 and e
S
1 are the gain and the QBER of single photon state in untagged bits. This
is because Alice and Bob can, in principle, measure the input photon number m and the
output photon number n accurately and therefore post-select the untagged bits with n = 1.
They can then use these post-selected single-photon untagged bits to generate the secure
key. In practice, QND measurements on m and n by Alice are not feasible with current
technology. However, Alice and Bob know the probability of certain bit to be untagged.
They can use random-hashing method to perform privacy amplification to distill the secure
key. Similar technique was used in [5].
The key generation rate in standard BB84 protocol is therefore given by
R ≥ 1
2
(rPA − rEC) ≥ 1
2
{−QSe f(ESe )H2(ESe ) + (1−∆− ε)QS1 [1−H2(eS1 )]}, (12)
where 1/2 is the probability that Alice and Bob use the same basis.
QSe , E
S
e , ∆, and ε can be determined experimentally. Our main task is to estimate Q
S
1
and eS1 .
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In previous analysis on decoy state QKD [20, 21, 22, 26], one important assumption is
that the yield of n photon state Yn in signal state is the same as Yn in decoy state. i.e.,
Y Sn = Y
D
n . Here Yn is defined as the conditional probability that Bob’s detectors generate a
click given that Alice sends out an n photon signal. This is true because in the analysis of
[20, 21, 22, 26] Eve knows only the output photon number n of each pulse. However, as we
will show below, this assumption is no longer valid in the case that the source is controlled
by Eve.
The key point is that Eve knows both the input photon number m and the output photon
number n when she controls both the source and the channel. Therefore she can perform
an attack that depends on the values of both m and n. In this case, the parameter that is
the same for these states is Ym,n, the conditional probability that Bob’s detectors click given
that this bit enters Alice’s lab with photon number m and is emitted from Alice’s lab with
photon number n. In this case, Yn is given by (see Appendix A for details)
Yn =
∑
m
P{m|n}Ym,n, (13)
where P{m|n} is the conditional probability that the signal enters Alice’s local lab with
photon number m given that it is emitted from Alice’s lab with photon number n. Note
that P{m|n} is dependent on the internal transmittance of Alice’s apparatus λ. Since
λS 6= λD, we know that Y Sn 6= Y Dn .
Another fundamental assumption for previous decoy state security studies [20, 21, 22]
is that the QBER of n-photon state en is the same for signal state and decoy state. i.e.,
eSn = e
D
n . Unfortunately, from a similar analysis as above, we can show that e
S
n 6= eDn if Eve
controls the source. The parameter that is the same for the signal state and the decoy states
is em,n.
As a brief summary, in decoy state QKD, if the source is in Alice’s local lab and is solely
accessible to Alice (that is, the source is trusted), we have Y Sn = Y
D
n and e
S
n = e
D
n , whereas if
the source is out of Alice’s local lab and is accessible to Eve (that is, the source is untrusted),
we have Y Sm,n = Y
D
m,n and e
S
m,n = e
D
m,n.
The dependence of Yn and en on different states (signal state or one of the decoy states)
is a fundamental difference between decoy state QKD with untrusted source and decoy state
QKD with trusted source. In the latter case, the independence of Yn and en on different states
is a very powerful constraint on Eve’s ability of eavesdropping. However, this constraint is
12
removed once the source is given to Eve.
Eve’s control over the source removes the two fundamental assumptions in [20, 21, 22].
Eve is given significantly greater power, and the security analysis is much more challenging.
However, rather surprisingly, it is still possible to achieve the unconditional security quan-
titatively even if the source is given to Eve. This is mainly because we are only focusing
on the untagged bits, whose input photon numbers are concentrated in a relatively narrow
range. Therefore we are still able to estimate QS1 and e
S
1 .
Proposition 1: the lower bound of QS1 for untagged bits is given by
QS1 > Q
S
1 = P
S
1
QDP S2 −QSPD2 + (P S0 PD2 − PD0 P S2 )QV −
2δN(1−λD)
2δN−1PS2
[(1−δ)N+1]!
PD1 P
S
2 − P S1 PD2
(14)
under Condition 2:
λS
λD
>
(1 + δ)N − 2
(1− δ)N − 2
[
(1 + δ)N − 2
2δN
] 2δN
(1−δ)N−2
[
(1 + δ)N − 2
(1− δ)N − 2 ·
e2
2δN
] 1
2[(1−δ)N−2]
. (15)
Here QS, QD and QV are the gains of untagged bits of the signal state, the decoy state,
and the vacuum state, respectfully. Their bounds can be estimated from Eqs. (1). The
bounds of the probabilities can be estimated from Eqs. (4). Note that Condition 2 is easy
to meet. For example, in the numerical simulation in Section VII, we chose N = 106 and
δ = 0.01. In this case we can calculate Condition 2 as λS
λD
> 1.104, which is very reasonable
to meet experimentally. Actually, λS/λD is usually greater than 2 in previous decoy state
QKD implementations [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34].
Proof: Appendix B.
Proposition 2: the upper bound of eS1 for untagged bits is given by
eS1 ≤ eS1 =
ESQS − P S0 EVQV
QS1
, (16)
in which ES and EV are the QBERs of untagged bits of the signal and the vacuum states,
respectively. ESQS and EVQV can be estimated from Eqs. (2). P S0 can be estimated by
Eqs. (4). QS1 is given by Eq. (14).
Proof: Appendix C.
Plugging Eqs. (14) & (16) into Eq. (12), we can easily calculate the overall key generation
rate of weak+vacuum decoy state QKD protocol given the source is under Eve’s control.
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B. One-decoy protocol (asymptotic case)
The one-decoy protocol is the simplest decoy state protocol. In the one-decoy protocol,
there are only two states: a signal state and a weak decoy state. It can be viewed as a
simplified version of the weak+vacuum protocol since it does not have the vacuum state.
The one-decoy protocol is of practical interest, particularly due to the difficulty of prepar-
ing perfect vacuum state. It has also been widely used in experiments [27, 33, 34].
Here, we will show that the one-decoy protocol is also applicable when the source is under
Eve’s control in the asymptotic case. The asymptotic case means that Alice sends infinitely
long bit sequence (K ∼ ∞).
In the one-decoy protocol, there is no vacuum state. Therefore we cannot measure QVe
or EVe , which means we cannot use Eqs. (1) to estimate Q
V in Eq. (14) or use Eqs. (2) to
estimate EVQV in Eq. (16). Nonetheless, we can still estimate QS1 and e
S
1 .
Proposition 3: In absence of the vacuum state, a lower bound of QS1 and an upper
bound of eS1 for untagged bits are given by
QS1 = P
S
1
QDP S2 −QSPD2 + (P S0 PD2 − PD0 P S2 )E
SQS
PS0 E
V
− 2δN(1−λD)
2δN−1PS2
[(1−δ)N+1]!
PD1 P
S
2 − P S1 PD2
,
eS1 =
ES ·QS
QS1
,
(17)
respectively under Condition 2 in the asymptotic case. Here QS and QD are the gains of
untagged bits of the signal state and the decoy state, respectively. Their bounds can be
estimated from Eqs. (1). ES is the QBER of untagged bits of the signal state. ES ·QS
can be estimated from Eqs. (2). EV = 0.5 in the asymptotic case. The bounds of the
probabilities can be estimated from Eqs. (4).
Proof: Appendix D.
Plugging Eqs. (17) into Eq. (12), we can easily calculate the overall key generation rate
of one-decoy protocol given the source is under Eve’s control.
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VII. NUMERICAL SIMULATION WITH COHERENT SOURCE:
ASYMPTOTIC CASE
In the asymptotic case, Alice sends infinitely long bit sequence (K ∼ ∞). Therefore we
can consider ε ∼ 0.
A. Calculating ∆
For any δ ∈ [0, 1], we can calculate ∆ by
∆ = 1− [Φ(N + δN)− Φ(N − δN)], (18)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the photon number for the input pulses.
Most QKD set-ups are based on coherent sources, which means that the input photon
number m obeys Poisson distribution. It is natural to set N to be the average input photon
number. For a Poisson distribution centered at N , its cumulative distribution function is
given by
Φp(x) =
Γ(⌊x+ 1⌋, N)
⌊x⌋! ,
where Γ(x, y) is the upper incomplete gamma function
Γ(x, y) =
∫
∞
y
tx−1e−tdt.
It is complicated to calculate Φp(x) numerically, particularly for large x. Therefore in
numerical simulation, we approximate the Poisson distribution by a Gaussian distribution
centered at N with a variance σ2 = N . Note this is an excellent approximation for large N .
The Gaussian cumulative distribution function is given by
Φg(x) =
1
2
[1 + erf(
x−N√
2N
)], (19)
where
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt
is the error function. Notice that erf(x) is an odd function, from Eqs. (18)(19) we have
∆ = 1− [Φg(N + δN)− Φg(N − δN)]
= 1− 1
2
[erf(
δN√
2N
)− erf(−δN√
2N
)] = 1− erf(
√
N
2
δ).
(20)
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B. Simulating experimental outputs
If the photon number of an input pulse obeys Poisson distribution with average photon
number N , the photon number of the output signal also follows Poisson distribution with
average photon number Nλ.
For a QKD setup with channel transmittance η(= e−αl, where α is the loss coefficient and
l is the distance between Alice and Bob), Bob’s quantum efficiency ηBob, detector intrinsic
error rate edet and background rate Y0, the gain and the QBER of the signals are expected
to be [22]
Qe = Y0 + 1− exp(−ηηBobNλ),
Ee =
e0Y0 + edet[1− exp(−ηηBobNλ)]
Qe
.
(21)
The experimental outputs are clearly determined by Alice’s internal transmittance λ which
needs to be set before the experiment. In our simulation, the optimal values for λS and λD
are selected numerically via exhaustive search.
With these simulated experimental outputs, we can calculate the lower bound of key
generation rate from Eqs (1), (2), (4), (9), (12), (14)–(21).
C. Simulation results
Our simulation is based on the parameters reported by [39] as shown in Table I.
We choose to set N = 106, which is very reasonable: if the wavelength is 1550 nm and
the pulse repetition rate is 1 MHz, the average input laser power will be ∼ 0.128µW, or
−38.9 dBm. Even if the channel loss from the source to Alice is 40dB (∼ 200km telecom
fiber), the required average output power from the source is ∼ 1.28mW, which can be easily
provided by many commercial pulsed laser diodes. We chose δ to be 10 standard deviations
as δ = 0.01.
The simulation result for GLLP protocol is shown in Fig. 2. We can see that the key
generation rate with an untrusted source is very close to that with a trusted source. Their
TABLE I: Simulation Parameter from GYS [39].
ηBob α Y0 edet
4.5% 0.21dB/km 1.7× 10−6 3.3%
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FIG. 2: Simulation of GLLP protocol for N = 106 and δ = 1%. Citing GYS [39] data. Inset:
the magnified tail. The two cases (with a trusted source and with an untrusted source) give very
similar results. We need to magnify the tail (see the inset) to see the slight advantage gained by
using a trusted source. We calculated the ratio of the key generation rate with an untrusted source
over that with a trusted source. The ratios are 98.0%, 97.7%, and 75.3% at 0 km, 20 km, and
40km, respectively.
difference is almost negligible, and is only visible by magnifying the tail (see the inset).
The simulation result for weak+vacuum protocol is shown in Fig. 3. We can see that the
key generation rate with an untrusted source is still very close to that with a trusted source.
By simply comparing the maximum transmission distances, we can see that the difference
is merely 5 km for weak+vacuum decoy state protocol.
The simulation result for one-decoy protocol is shown in Fig. 4. We can see that the key
generation rate with an untrusted source is still very close to that with a trusted source.
The difference of maximum transmission distances is merely 8 km.
The above results are surprisingly good because we did not assume any a priori knowledge
about the source in the security analysis. In other words, Alice and Bob do not know the
fact that the source is Poissonian and therefore they cannot assume any photon number
distribution.
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FIG. 3: Simulation of weak+vacuum decoy state protocol for N = 106 and δ = 1%. Citing GYS
[39] data. The two cases (with a trusted source and with an untrusted source) give very close
results. We calculated the ratio of the key generation rate with an untrusted source over that with
a trusted source. The ratios are 77.3%, 76.8%, and 73.6% at 0 km, 50 km, and 100km, respectively.
One important reason for achieving this high performance is that we applied heavy at-
tenuation on the input pulses. Note that the input pulse has ∼ 106 photons, while the
output pulse has less than one photon on average. The internal attenuation of Alice’s local
lab is greater than -60dB. We know that heavy attenuation will transform arbitrary photon
number distribution into a Poisson-like distribution.
As we mentioned before, δ can be arbitrarily chosen. However, choosing δ too large or too
small will make the security analysis less optimal (i.e., conservative). Examples are given in
Fig. 5. We can clearly see that inappropriate choice of δ can deteriorate the performance
of the system. The one-decoy protocol with untrusted source is particularly sensitive to the
value of δ.
The analytical optimization of δ can be complicated. Here we just study this problem
numerically. We calculated the maximum possible transmission distances for different δ.
The results are shown in Fig. 6. We can clearly see that there is an optimal choice of δ.
Note that our analysis is valid for arbitrary value of δ. The optimal value of δ will give us
the optimal (while still being rigorous) estimate on the security of the system. Alice and
18
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
Distance (km)
Ke
y 
G
en
er
at
io
n 
Ra
te
 (p
er 
pu
lse
)
 
 
Untrusted Source
Trusted Source
FIG. 4: Simulation of one-decoy protocol for N = 106 and δ = 1%. Citing GYS [39] data. The two
cases (with a trusted source and with an untrusted source) give very close results. We calculated
the ratio of the key generation rate with an untrusted source over that with a trusted source. The
ratios are 68.6%, 67.1%, and 37.1% at 0 km, 50 km, and 100km, respectively.
Bob do not need to choose a certain value of δ before the experiment. They only need to
find an optimal value of δ during the data post-processing.
The flat top in the curve of Fig. 6 suggests the insensitivity of the maximum transmis-
sion distance on δ in a wide range. We can see that the maximum transmission distance
changes only 8% within the range of δ from 5 standard deviations to 100 standard devi-
ations. Therefore in practice, one can simply set δ to be a few standard deviations and
achieve near-optimal results.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the first rigorous quantitative security analysis of a QKD system
with an unknown and untrusted source. This analysis is particularly important for the
security of a standard “Plug & Play” system. We showed that, rather surprisingly, even with
an unknown and untrusted source, unconditional security of QKD system is still achievable,
with and without the decoy method. Moreover, we explicitly give the e
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(b)Simulation for N = 106 and δ = 11%.
FIG. 5: Simulation results for too small (a) and too large (b) values of δ. Citing GYS [39] data.
Both figures show key rates of different protocols with untrusted source.
that have to be taken to ensure the security, and the theoretical analysis that can be directly
applied to calculate the final secure key generation rate. One can easily extend our analysis
to understand the security of QKD network, in which the source is often untrusted.
For the first time, the unconditional security of the “plug & play” QKD system with
current technology is made possible by us. The “plug & play” structure has clear advantage
over uni-directional structure since it does not require any active compensation on the phase
or the polarization. The self-compensating property of the “plug & play” structure makes
it much simpler to implement than the uni-directional structure, and makes it much quieter
(i.e., much lower QBER). All the commercial QKD systems [40, 41] are based on this simple
and reliable structure. However, the lack of rigorous security analysis has been an obstacle
for its development for a long time. With our straightforward theoretical and experimental
solution, we expect the “plug & play” structure to receive much more attention.
The security of practical QKD systems is a serious issue. Recently, several quantum
hacking works have been reported [14, 42]. It is very important to implement QKD system
based on tested assumptions. There are still several crucial imperfections that are not
analyzed in this paper. For example, how can we understand the imperfection due to
non-single-mode (note that this is particularly important for free-space QKD)? How can
we analyze the fluctuation of internal transmittance λ? Also, how can we test the key
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FIG. 6: Maximum transmission distances of weak+vacuum protocol for various choices of δs.
assumptions in our analysis: Y Sm,n = Y
D
m,n and e
S
m,n = e
D
m,n? These question marks suggest
us a simple fact: although we are approaching the unconditional security of practical QKD
set-up, we are not there yet.
We thank enlightening discussions with C. H. Bennett, C.-H. F. Fung, D. Gottesman, D.
F. V. James, X. Ma, J.-W. Pan, L. Qian, and X.-B. Wang. Support of the funding agencies
CFI, CIPI, the CRC program, CIFAR, MITACS, NSERC, OIT, and PREA is gratefully
acknowledged.
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Com-
puters, Systems, and Signal Processing (IEEE, 1984), pp. 175 – 179.
[2] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[3] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[4] D. Mayers, J. of ACM 48, 351 (2001); H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999);
P. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
[5] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and J. Preskill, Quant. Info. Compu. 4, 325 (2004).
[6] H. Inamori, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and D. Mayers, European Physical Journal D 41, 599 (2007).
[7] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev
(2008), arXiv:0802.4155.
21
[8] A. Acin, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar, S. Pironio, and V. Scarani, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98,
230501 (2007).
[9] L. Masanes and A. Winter (2006), quant-ph/0606049.
[10] J. Barrett, L. Hardy, and A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 010503 (2005).
[11] V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, Phys. Rev. A 74, 022313 (2006).
[12] V. Makarov and J. Skaar (2007), quant-ph/0702262.
[13] B. Qi, C.-H. F. Fung, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma, Quant. Info. Compu. 7, 73 (2007).
[14] Y. Zhao, C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H.-K. Lo (2007), arXiv:0704.3253.
[15] Y. Zhao, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, Appl. Phys. Lett. 90, 044106 (2007).
[16] H.-K. Lo and J. Preskill (2006), quant-ph/0610203.
[17] D. Stucki, N. Gisin, O. Guinnard, G. Robordy, and H. Zbinden, New J. of Phys. 4, 41 (2002).
[18] N. Gisin, S. Fasel, B. Kraus, H. Zbinden, and G. Ribordy, Phys. Rev. A 73, 022320 (2006).
[19] W. Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[20] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230504 (2005).
[21] H.-K. Lo, in Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (IEEE,
2004), p. 137.
[22] X. Ma, B. Qi, Y. Zhao, and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 72, 012326 (2005).
[23] X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[24] X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. A 72, 012322 (2005).
[25] J. W. Harrington, J. M. Ettinger, R. J. Hughes, and J. E. Nordholt (2005), quant-ph/0503002.
[26] X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, F. Dupuis, K. Chen, K. Tamaki, and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 74,
032330 (2006).
[27] Y. Zhao, B. Qi, X. Ma, H.-K. Lo, and L. Qian, Phys. Rev. Lett. 96, 070502 (2006).
[28] Y. Zhao, B. Qi, X. Ma, H.-K. Lo, and L. Qian, in Proceedings of IEEE International Sympo-
sium of Information Theory (IEEE, 2006), pp. 2094–2098.
[29] T. Schmitt-Manderbach, et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010504 (2007).
[30] C.-Z. Peng, et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010505 (2007).
[31] D. Rosenberg, et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010503 (2007).
[32] J. F. Dynes, Z. L. Yuan, A. W. Sharpe, and A. J. Shields, Opt. Express 15, 8465 (2007).
[33] Z. L. Yuan, A. W. Sharpe, and A. J. Shields, Appl. Phys. Lett. 90, 011118 (2007).
[34] Z.-Q. Yin, Z.-F. Han, W. Chen, F.-X. Xu, Q.-L. Wu, and G.-C. Guo (2007), arXiv:0704.2941.
22
[35] X.-B. Wang, C.-Z. Peng, J. Zhang, and J.-W. Pan (2008), quant-ph/0612121v3.
[36] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2000).
[37] The gain is defined to be the ratio of the number of receiver Bob’s detection events to the
number of signals emitted by sender Alice in the cases where Alice and Bob use the same
basis. It depends mainly on the intensity of signal, channel transmittance, and Bob’s quantum
efficiency.
[38] G. Brassard and L. Salvail, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Springer, 1994), vol. 765, pp.
410–423.
[39] C. Gobby, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, Appl. Phys. Lett. 84, 3762 (2004).
[40] www.idquantique.com.
[41] www.magiqtech.com.
[42] A. Lamas-Linares and C. Kurtsiefer, Opt. Express 15, 9388 (2007).
APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF Yn
We setM as the random variable of the input photon number, N as the random variable
of the output photon number, and C as the random variable of Bob’s detector status (y =
detection, n = no detection). Yn is then given by the conditional probability
Yn = Pr{C = y|N = n}, (A1)
and Ym,n is given by the conditional probability
Ym,n = Pr{C = y|N = n&M = m}. (A2)
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Yn can be expended as
Yn = Pr{C = y|N = n}
=
Pr{C = y&N = n}
Pr{N = n}
=
∞∑
m=0
Pr{C = y&N = n&M = m}
Pr{N = n}
=
∞∑
m=0
Pr{N = n&M = m}
Pr{N = n}
Pr{C = y&N = n&M = m}
Pr{N = n&M = m}
=
∞∑
m=0
Pr{M = m|N = n}Pr{C = y|N = n&M = m}
=
∞∑
m=0
P{m|n}Ym,n. ✷
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATE OF QS1
From definition [37], we know that the gain of untagged bits is given by
Q =
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
∞∑
n=0
Pin(m)Pn(m)Ym,n,
where Pin(m) is the probability that the input signal contains m photons (i.e., the ratio of
the number of signals with m input photons over K), Pn(m) is the conditional probability
that the output signal contains n photons given the input signal contains m photons, and
is given by Eq. (3).
The gains for signal, decoy, and vacuum states in untagged bits are therefore given by
QS =
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
∞∑
n=0
Pin(m)P
S
n (m)Ym,n,
QD =
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
∞∑
n=0
Pin(m)P
D
n (m)Ym,n,
QV =
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,0,
(B1)
respectively. Here P
S/D
n (m) is Pn(m) for the signal/decoy state. Their bounds can be
estimated from Eqs. (4). QS/D/V cannot be measured experimentally, but their upper
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bounds and lower bounds can be estimated from Eqs. (1). Note that ∆S/D/V should be
determined experimentally. In asymptotic case, ∆S = ∆D = ∆V . If the bit sequence sent
by Alice is finite, ∆S/D/V may not be exactly the same due to statistical fluctuation.
We know that
QS1 =
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)P
S
1 (m)Ym,1 ≥ P S1
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,1 = P
S
1 Z1, (B2)
in which P S1 can be calculated from Eqs. (4), and Z1 is defined as
Z1 =
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,1. (B3)
If we can put a lower bound on Z1, we will be able to estimate the lower bound of Q
S
1 .
Z1 clearly arises from the contribution of single photon signals. A natural strategy is
to find an appropriate linear combination of QS and QD, in which the multi-photon signal
contribution is minimized (while keeping it positive) so that we can set a lower bound on it
as zero. Among all the multi-photon signals, the two photon signal has much greater weight
than signals with more photons. Therefore, we will try to eliminate the two-photon signal
contribution first. Note that we can easily estimate the contribution of vacuum signals from
QV and EV .
Eqs. (4) show that P Sn ≤ P Sn (m) ≤ P Sn and PDn ≤ PDn (m) ≤ PDn for untagged bits.
25
Combining them with Eqs. (B1), we have
QSPD2 −QDP S2 =
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)
∞∑
n=0
[P Sn (m)P
D
2 − PDn (m)P S2 ]Ym,n
≥
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)
∞∑
n=0
[P Sn P
D
2 − PDn P S2 ]Ym,n
=
∞∑
n=0
[P Sn P
D
2 − PDn P S2 ]
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,n
= a0
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,0 + a1
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,1
+ (P S2 P
D
2 − PD2 P S2 )
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,2 +
(1−δ)N∑
n=3
a2(n)
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,n + a3
= a0
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,0 + a1
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,1
+
(1−δ)N∑
n=3
a2(n)
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,n + a3
= a0Z0 + a1Z1 +
(1−δ)N∑
n=3
a2(n)Z2(n) + a3
(B4)
where
a0 = P
S
0 P
D
2 − PD0 P S2 ; (B5)
a1 = P
S
1 P
D
2 − PD1 P S2 ; (B6)
a2(n) = P
S
n P
D
2 − PDn P S2 ; (B7)
a3 = −
(1+δ)N∑
n=(1−δ)N+1
PDn P
S
2
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,n = −
(1+δ)N∑
n=(1−δ)N+1
PDn P
S
2 Z3(n); (B8)
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and
Z0 =
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,0 = Q
V ; (B9)
Z2(n) =
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,n; (B10)
Z3(n) =
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,n. (B11)
Note that in Eq. (B4), when n = 2, the term P Sn P
D
2 − PDn P S2 = 0, which means we
have removed the contribution from the two-photon signals. Our strategy is clear now: the
contribution of vacuum signals (a0Z0) can be easily bounded as a0 can be calculated from
Eqs. (B5) and an upper bound of Z0 is given by Z0 = QV , which can be calculated from
Eqs. (1); the contribution of single photon signals (a1Z1) is to be estimated while we know
the exact value of a1; we need to put some bounds on the higher order terms (a2 and a3) to
complete an estimate of Z1. As we will show below, a1 is negative under certain condition.
Therefore we should put a lower bound on the higher order terms to find the lower bound
of Z1.
Lemma 1
a1 is negative under Condition 2a:
λS
λD
>
(1 + δ)N − 1
(1− δ)N − 1 .
Proof:
Expand Eq. (B6) we have
a1 = P
S
1 P
D
2 − PD1 P S2
= (1− δ)NλS(1− λS)(1−δ)N−1 (1 + δ)N [(1 + δ)N − 1]
2
λ2D(1− λD)(1+δ)N−2
− (1 + δ)NλD(1− λD)(1+δ)N−1 (1− δ)N [(1− δ)N − 1]
2
λ2S(1− λS)(1−δ)N−2
= N2(1− δ2)λ2Sλ2D(1− λS)(1−δ)N−2(1− λD)(1+δ)N−2
[
(1 + δ)N − 1
2λS
− (1− δ)N − 1
2λD
− δN
]
.
(B12)
For Eq. (B12) we can see that a1 < 0 under Condition 2a:
λS
λD
>
(1 + δ)N − 1
(1− δ)N − 1 . ✷
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Lemma 1′
a0 is negative under Condition 2a.
Proof:
a0 = P
S
0 P
D
2 − PD0 P S2
= (1− λS)(1+δ)N (1 + δ)N [(1 + δ)N − 1]
2
λ2D(1− λD)(1+δ)N−2
− (1− λD)(1−δ)N (1− δ)N [(1 − δ)N − 1]
2
λ2S(1− λS)(1−δ)N−2
=
1
2
(1− λS)(1−δ)N−2(1− λD)(1−δ)N{(1− λS)2δN+2(1 + δ)N [(1 + δ)N − 1]
· λ2D(1− λD)2δN−2 − (1− δ)N [(1− δ)N − 1]λ2S}
<
1
2
(1− λS)(1−δ)N−2(1− λD)(1−δ)N{(1 + δ)N [(1 + δ)N − 1]λ2D
− (1− δ)N [(1− δ)N − 1]λ2S}
=
1
2
(1− λS)(1−δ)N−2(1− λD)(1−δ)N{[(1 + δ)N − 1]2λ2D + [(1 + δ)N − 1]λ2D
− [(1− δ)N − 1]2λ2S − [(1− δ)N − 1]λ2S}
< 0
(B13)
In the last step, we made use of Condition 2a. ✷
Lemma 2
a2(n) is positive under Condition 2:
λS
λD
>
(1 + δ)N − 2
(1− δ)N − 2
[
(1 + δ)N − 2
2δN
] 2δN
(1−δ)N−2
[
(1 + δ)N − 2
(1− δ)N − 2 ·
e2
2δN
] 1
2[(1−δ)N−2]
.
Proof:
Expanding Eq. (B7), note that 3 ≤ n ≤ (1− δ)N , we have
a2(n) = P
S
n P
D
2 − PDn P S2
=
(
(1− δ)N
n
)
λnS(1− λS)(1−δ)N−n
(1 + δ)N [(1 + δ)N − 1]
2
λ2D(1− λD)(1+δ)N−2
−
(
(1 + δ)N
n
)
λnD(1− λD)(1+δ)N−n
(1− δ)N [(1 − δ)N − 1]
2
λ2S(1− λS)(1−δ)N−2
= λ2Sλ
2
D(1− λS)(1−δ)N−n(1− λD)(1+δ)N−n
[(1− δ)N ]![(1 + δ)N ]!
2 · n! [b1(n)− b2(n)],
(B14)
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where
b1(n) =
λn−2S (1− λD)n−2
[(1− δ)N − n]![(1 + δ)N − 2]! > 0,
b2(n) =
λn−2D (1− λS)n−2
[(1 + δ)N − n]![(1− δ)N − 2]! > 0.
To show that a2(n) > 0, we need to show that b1(n) > b2(n). Since they are both positive,
we could try to show that b1(n)/b2(n) > 1.
b1(n)
b2(n)
=
[(1 + δ)N − n]![(1 − δ)N − 2]!
[(1 + δ)N − 2]![(1− δ)N − n]!
[
λS(1− λD)
λD(1− λS)
]n−2
=
n∏
i=3
[
(1− δ)N − i+ 1
(1 + δ)N − i+ 1 ·
λS(1− λD)
λD(1− λS)
]
.
Define the last term of the product as
d(n) =
(1− δ)N − n+ 1
(1 + δ)N − n + 1 ·
λS(1− λD)
λD(1− λS) ,
which is a decreasing function of n. Note that d(n) is always positive. Due to the decreasing
nature of dn on n, there exists a real number n0 satisfying the following criterium: for any
n < n0, d(n) > 1; for any n ≥ n0, d(n) ≥ 1. We can easily see the following facts:
1) If n < n0, we know for sure that b1(n)/b2(n) > 1, which means a2(n) > 0.
2) If n ≥ n0, b1(n)/b2(n) decreases as n increases. Since n ≤ (1− δ)N , we have
b1(n)
b2(n)
=
n∏
i=3
[
(1− δ)N − i+ 1
(1 + δ)N − i+ 1 ·
λS(1− λD)
λD(1− λS)
]
≥
(1−δ)N∏
i=3
[
(1− δ)N − i+ 1
(1 + δ)N − i+ 1 ·
λS(1− λD)
λD(1− λS)
]
=
[(1− δ)N − 2]!(2δN)!
[(1 + δ)N − 2]!
[
λS(1− λD)
λD(1− λS)
](1−δ)N−2
=
1(
(1+δ)N−2
2δN
)
[
λS(1− λD)
λD(1− λS)
](1−δ)N−2
.
Therefore a2(n) > 0 under Condition 2b:
λS
λD
>
(
(1 + δ)N − 2
2δN
) 1
(1−δ)N−2
.
Note that N is usually very large, which means the evaluation of Condition 2b can be
computationally challenging. To simplify this condition, we can make use of Stirling’s ap-
proximation
√
2pinn+
1
2 exp(−n + 1
12n+ 1
) < n! <
√
2pinn+
1
2 exp(−n + 1
12n
),
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which can be simplified to be
nn+
1
2 e−n < n! < nn+
1
2 e−n+1. (B15)
With the help of Eq. (B15), we can derive a simpler and stronger version of Condition 2b:
Condition 2:
λS
λD
>
(1 + δ)N − 2
(1− δ)N − 2
[
(1 + δ)N − 2
2δN
] 2δN
(1−δ)N−2
[
(1 + δ)N − 2
(1− δ)N − 2 ·
e2
2δN
] 1
2[(1−δ)N−2]
.✷
Note that Condition 2 is also stronger than Condition 2a. Therefore Lemma 1 is also
true under Condition 2.
Lemma 2′∑(1−δ)N
n=3 a2(n)Z2(n) ≥ 0 under Condition 2.
Proof:
From Eq. (B10) we can clearly see that Z2(n) ≥ 0. ✷
Lemma 3
a3 > −
2δN(1− λD)2δN−1P S2
[(1− δ)N + 1]! .
Proof:
Expand Eq. (B8), we have
a3 = −
(1+δ)N∑
n=(1−δ)N+1
PDn P
S
2 Z3(n)
≥ −
(1+δ)N∑
n=(1−δ)N+1
PDn P
S
2 (∵ 0 ≤ Z3(n) ≤ 1)
≥ −2δNPD(1−δ)N+1P S2 (∵ 0 ≤ PDn < PD(1−δ)N+1)
= −2δN
(
(1 + δ)N
(1− δ)N + 1
)
λ
(1−δ)N+1
D (1− λD)2δN−1P S2
= −2δN 1
[(1− δ)N + 1]!(1− λD)
2δN−1P S2
(1−δ)N∏
i=0
{[(1 + δ)N − i]λD}
> −2δN(1 − λD)
2δN−1P S2
[(1− δ)N + 1]! . (∵ [(1 + δ)N − i]λD < 1)
✷
(B16)
Note that |a3| is in the order of O( 1N !). It is very close to 0.
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From Eqs. (B4)-(B16) we can conclude that
Z1 ≥
QDP S2 −QSPD2 + a0QV +
∑(1−δ)N
n=3 a2(n)Z2(n) + a3
−a1
>
QDP S2 −QSPD2 + a0QV −
2δN(1−λD)
2δN−1PS2
[(1−δ)N+1]!
−a1 = Z1.
under Condition 2:
λS
λD
>
(1 + δ)N − 2
(1− δ)N − 2
[
(1 + δ)N − 2
2δN
] 2δN
(1−δ)N−2
[
(1 + δ)N − 2
(1− δ)N − 2 ·
e2
2δN
] 1
2[(1−δ)N−2]
.
Therefore the lower bound of QS1 is given by
QS1 ≥ P S1 Z1 > P S1 Z1
= P S1
QDP S2 −QSPD2 + (P S0 PD2 − PD0 P S2 )QV −
2δN(1−λD)
2δN−1PS2
[(1−δ)N+1]!
PD1 P
S
2 − P S1 PD2
= QS1
This completes our proof of Proposition 1.
APPENDIX C: ESTIMATE OF eS1
The derivation of the upper bound of eS1 is relatively simpler than that of the lower bound
of QS1 . Similar as Eq. (B4) we have
ES ·QS =
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)
∞∑
n=0
P Sn (m)Ym,nem,n,
where em,n is the error rate for signals with m input photons and n output photons. Rear-
ranging terms, we have
QS1 e
S
1 = E
S ·QS −QS0 eS0 −
∞∑
n=2
QSne
S
n
≤ ES ·QS −QS0 eS0
= ES ·QS −
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)P
S
0 (m)Ym,0em,0
≤ ES ·QS − P S0
(1+δ)N∑
m=(1−δ)N
Pin(m)Ym,0em,0
= ES ·QS − P S0 EV ·QV .
(C1)
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The upper bound of eS1 is thus given by
eS1 ≤
ES ·QS − P S0 EV ·QV
QS1
≤ E
S ·QS − P S0 EV ·QV
QS1
.
This completes our proof of Proposition 2.
APPENDIX D: THE ONE-DECOY PROTOCOL
In one-decoy protocol, there is no vacuum state. Therefore we cannot measure QVe or
EVe . If we still want to estimate Q
S
1 via Eq. (14) and e
S
1 via Eq. (16), we need to estimate
QV in Eq. (14) and E
V ·QV in Eq. (16) in another way.
To estimate QV , we can look into Eq. (C1):
P S0 E
VQV ≤ ESQS −QS1 eS1 ≤ ESQS ≤ ESQS.
Therefore
QV ≤ E
SQS
P S0 E
V
= QV , (D1)
where ESQS can be estimated from Eqs. (2), P S0 can be estimated from Eqs. (4), and
EV = 0.5 in asymptotic case.
Plugging Eq. (D1) into Eq. (14), we have the expression of QS1 with the one-decoy
protocol:
QS1 > Q
S
1 = P
S
1
QDP S2 −QSPD2 + (P S0 PD2 − PD0 P S2 )E
SQS
PS0 E
V
− 2δN(1−λD)
2δN−1PS2
[(1−δ)N+1]!
PD1 P
S
2 − P S1 PD2
As for the estimate of EV ·QV , we can simply use the following fact: EV · QV ≥ 0.
Therefore the expression of eS1 in one-decoy protocol is given by
eS1 ≤ eS1 =
ES ·QS
QS1
.
This completes our proof of Proposition 3.
